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Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he has a
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address and an explanation of his actions.
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides:
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persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
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and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890175
Priority No. 2

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26 (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a
criminal case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final
judgment and conviction and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5)
(1953 as amended) whereby this Court has discretion to grant a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

On June 12, 1989, this Court entered its order granting

Ms. Johnson's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals on all issues raised herein.

See Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant, Karen Johnson, appeals from a conviction and
judgment for Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as
amended).

The trial judge found her guilty after a bench trial held

on April 1, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge,

presiding.
Ms. Johnson timely appealed her conviction to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

On March 21, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued

its opinion affirming the conviction.

That opinion is published at

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989) (Addendum B ) .
On April 4, 1989, Ms. Johnson timely filed a Petition for
Rehearing with the Court of Appeals.

Two days later, on April 6,

1989, that court denied Ms. Johnson's Petition for Rehearing.
On May 4, 1989, Ms. Johnson timely filed a Petition for
Writ of Ceriorari with this Court.

On June 12, 1989, this Court

entered its order granting Ms. Johnson's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari (Addendum A ) .

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 3, 1986, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Deputy
Stroud of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office stopped a yellow
1972 Mercury Capri with a broken brake light (T. 5-6). According to
the officer, he ran a check on the license plates of the vehicle
prior to the actual stop and obtained the name of the registered
owner (T. 6).
After stopping the vehicle, the officer approached and
asked the driver for identification (T. 6). She produced a driver's
license but was unable to produce registration which the officer
requested when he learned that the driver was not the registered
owner (T. 6).
The officer then asked the passenger, Karen Johnson, for

- 2

-

identification (T. 6-7J.1

She told the officer she did not have

identification but gave him her name and date of birth.

The deputy

took the driver's license and the information from Ms. Johnson back
to his vehicle, where he called dispatch and inquired whether each
individual had a valid driver's license and whether there were any
outstanding warrants on either woman (T. 7, 15). He told the driver
and Ms. Johnson that he would be back in a minute and indicated that
he expected Ms. Johnson to wait while he returned to his car (T. 22).
The deputy testified that he ran a check on Ms. Johnson
"[b]ecause there was a possibility that [the] vehicle could have
been stolen" (T. 7-8). However, he did not ask the driver how she
came to be in possession of the vehicle or otherwise attempt to
ascertain whether the vehicle was stolen by questioning the driver
or Ms. Johnson.

Nor did the deputy run a check to determine whether

the car was stolen (T. 12).
The officer also testified that it was not unusual to
stop cars and find that the owner was not driving (T. 17, 18). The
car was in fact not stolen (T. 16), and the only information which
made the officer speculate that it might be stolen was the fact that
the registered owner was not driving and the driver was unable to
find the registration (T. 7-8).
The officer acknowledged that ascertaining whether
Ms. Johnson had a valid driver's license would not help him

1

Contrary to the findings of the trial judge, as
adopted by the Court of Appeals, the officer did not learn that the
driver's license was suspended until after he detained Appellant
(T. 6, 7, 15) .
- 3

-

determine whether the car was stolen (T. 15) but claimed that if
Ms. Johnson had outstanding warrants for car theft, he "possibly11
would think it more likely that the vehicle had been stolen (T. 16).
The car was in fact not stolen, and Appellant was merely
riding with her friend to pick up the child of her friend's roommate
(T. 24) .
The officer testified that it was his normal procedure to
obtain the name and date of birth of passengers in a traffic stop
and that he routinely used this practice to pick up people who might
have outstanding warrants (T. 20, 21). The officer was unsure how
much time passed from when he returned to his car until he received
information from dispatch, but he knew it was at least several
minutes (T. 19). According to Ms. Johnson, fifteen minutes passed
between the time the officer asked her for her name and the time he
returned (T. 28) .
Several minutes after the officer returned to his
vehicle, dispatch informed him that the driver had a suspended
driver's license and that Ms. Johnson had outstanding warrants
(T. 8) .
The officer arrested Ms. Johnson and, incident to that
arrest, searched her bag and found the evidence with which she was
convicted of the offense in this case (T. 9-11).
Ms. Johnson's testimony differed from that of Officer
Stroud in that she recalled that the officer first took the license
of the driver to his car, then returned in five to ten minutes
(T. 26). She remembered the length of time because she smoked one
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or two cigarettes while waiting (T. 26). When he returned, the
officer asked Ms. Johnson to walk back to his car and give him her
name and date of birth.

The officer wrote the information on a

clipboard, then told Ms. Johnson to return to and sit in the vehicle
in which she had been riding (T. 27).
Prior to trial, Ms. Johnson, by and through counsel,
filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from her person or
property on the grounds that all items seized were the fruit of an
unlawful seizure of her person in violation of the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution (R. 14-15).2

The trial court held an evidentiary

hearing on the motion, after which it denied the motion to suppress
"unless defendant can submit law to the contrary" (R. 17).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The fact that the driver of a vehicle is not the
registered owner and the driver cannot locate the registration does
not amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is
stolen and that a passenger in the vehicle was involved in the
theft.

Having a driver who is not the registered owner is

consistent with innocent behavior, i.e. that the driver borrowed the
car.

The inability of a nonowner—or even an owner—to find

registration does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion the

2

A typographical error in the motion incorrectly
labeled the applicable provision in the Utah Constitution as
Article I, § 13.
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vehicle is stolen.
Assuming, arguendo, that the officer had a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, he exceeded the
scope of any permissible detention by failing to diligently pursue
an investigation as to whether the vehicle was stolen.

Running a

warrants check on Ms. Johnson did not aid the officer in determining
whether the vehicle was stolen.
The detention of Ms. Johnson was unreasonable and the
fruits of that unreasonable seizure should be suppressed.
Appellant adequately raised the Utah Constitutional issue
in the trial court and preserved that issue for review by referring
to the Utah Constitutional provision in her Motion to Suppress and
memorandum in support thereof and by briefly arguing it during the
hearing.
Detaining a passenger in a motor vehicle for a warrants
check is a seizure under the Utah Constitution.

The Utah

Constitution offers greater protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures than does the federal constitution.

The

seizure was not reasonable under the Utah Constitution, and the
fruits thereof should be suppressed.

- 6

-

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE DETENTION OF APPELLANT VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

While not all

encounters between police and citizens amount to "seizures" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, where such a seizure does
occur, the requirements of that amendment apply.

See State v.

Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-8 (Utah 1987).
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly decided that Deputy
Stroud "seized" Appellant in this case when he "told her to wait
while he returned to his vehicle to check on the driver's license
and to run a warrants check on defendant."
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App. 1989).

State v. Johnson, 771

In reaching its decision, the Court

quoted its opinion in State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App.
1987), pointing out that
A seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment occurs only when the officer by means of
physical force or show of authority has in some
way restricted the liberty of a person.
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328.

As the Court noted further, a seizure

occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, believes he is not free to leave.

Id.;

see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
The stop of a motor vehicle is a detention of the driver
and the occupants of the vehicle.

See Delaware v. Prouse, 44 0 U.S.

648 (1979); State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989).
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When an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, "he may
briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the
vehicle registration and the driver's license."
at 1135.

Schlosser, 774 P.2d

The further detention of a passenger for the purposes of

obtaining identification and running a warrants check goes beyond
the scope of a detention for a traffic violation and requires a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the passenger is involved in
criminal activity in order to withstand fourth amendment scrutiny.
See Johnson v. State, 601 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1980) pet.
cert, denied June 30, 1980; see also Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135.3
In the present case, the officer testified that after
obtaining Ms. Johnson's name and date of birth, he went back to his
vehicle to run a warrants check on both Ms. Johnson and the driver
as well as a check to determine whether each woman's license was
valid (T. 7 ) . Several minutes passed while he ran the check
(T. 19); during that time, Deputy Stroud expected Ms. Johnson to
wait for him (T. 22), and she sat in the car and waited as expected
(To 29-30). 4

Given the deputy's testimony that Ms. Johnson was not

free to leave, the determination of the Court of Appeals that Deputy

3

In United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir.
1973), the Court held that an officer needed a reasonable
articulable suspicion in order to detain an individual for a
warrants check after issuing the defendant a citation. Although
Luckett did not involve a vehicle stop, it supports the proposition
that detaining a person in order to run a warrants check is a
seizure.
4

Ms. Johnson and Deputy Stroud had slightly different
versions of what occurred. She testified that he told her to wait
and that the warrants check took fifteen minutes (T. 26-27).
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Stroud seized Ms. Johnson was correct.
In order for a seizure to be upheld under the fourth
amendment, the officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion
that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-8 (Utah 1987).

A majority of

the panel in the Court of Appeals which heard this case held that
Deputy Stroud had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
vehicle was stolen which justified the detention of Ms. Johnson
under the fourth amendment.

Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328-9.

Judge Orme

dissented, stating simply:
The only facts relied on by the officer were that
the driver's name was not the name of the
registered owner and the driver was not able to
locate the registration certificate. These facts
are just as consistent with the more likely
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from its
rightful owner. Absent more—and this is all the
officer pointed to—there was simply no
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, that
the car had been stolen.
Id. at 36.

In reaching its decision, the majority misconstrued the

facts in this case and misapplied the law.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court carved out a limited exception to the general probable
cause requirement under the fourth amendment.

In order to justify a

particular detention, an officer must be able to point to specific
articulable facts which, when viewed under an objective standard,
create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed or is
about to commit a crime.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
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Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

This Court and the Utah

Court of Appeals have applied that standard in numerous cases. See,
e.g., State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam);
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986); State v. Truiillo, 739
P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.
1988) .
Although the determination as to whether an officer had a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the detained person was
involved in criminal activity is "fact sensitive," examples of cases
where the appellate court held that the officer lacked such a
suspicion are illustrative.

See Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976.

In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1985), at
3:00 a.m., a police officer seized the individuals in a vehicle with
Arizona license plates which had been moving slowly through a
neighborhood where a number of burglaries had recently occurred.
This Court held that the officer lacked a reasonable articulable
suspicion "that the occupants of the car were engaged in or about to
engage in any criminal activity."

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976, citing

Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675.
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976-7 (Utah App. 1987),
neither Sierra's "nervous behavior" nor his driving in the left lane
was sufficient to justify a stop.
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987).

See also State v. Mendoza, 748

In State v. Schlosser, the passenger in

a vehicle stopped for speeding moved around in the cab of the truck
while the driver walked back to the officer's car with a driver's
license and registration.

This Court determined that the officer
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did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the passenger
was involved in criminal activity.

Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137.

The only facts articulated by the officer in an attempt
to justify the detention of Ms. Johnson were that the driver was not
the owner of the vehicle and the driver could not find the
registration (T. 13). The deputy claimed that those two facts led
him to believe there was a "possibility" that the vehicle was stolen
(T. 7-8). 5

However, his "suspicion" was not strong enough to cause

him to run a check on the car to see if it was stolen or otherwise
pursue that "possibility" (T. 12).
Although the officer based his speculation on the fact
that the driver was not the registered owner and could not produce
registration, he testified that such a situation is not unusual
(T. 17, 18). Common sense suggests that the inability to find
registration is as consistent with the circumstances of a borrowed
car as it is with a stolen car.

5

The trial court in part based its decision on the fact
that the driver was unable to produce a valid license (T. 4 6-7).
The deputy was not aware, however, that the driver's license was
suspended until after he had detained Ms. Johnson (T. 6, 7, 15).
Therefore, this fact does not figure into the determination as to
whether the deputy had a reasonable articulable suspicion.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the trial
court's statement that:
where there is a legitimate traffic stop, the
driver has a suspended license, and there is "no
way of telling who the owner of the vehicle is and
whether they have permission to drive it because
the owner is not present," a reasonable officer
would inquire regarding the identity of a
passenger.
771 P.2d at 329 (emphasis added).
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In addition, a "possibility" is not equivalent to a
constitutionally required reasonable articulable suspicion.

It is

more along the lines of a hunch or speculation, neither of which
support a seizure under the fourth amendment.

See State v.

Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah App. 1987).
Furthermore, a "possibility" that a car is stolen does
not automatically implicate the passenger in any illegal activity.
See State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-3 (Utah 1986) ("[A] person's
mere presence in the company of others whom the police have probable
cause to search does not provide probable cause to search that
person."

Id., citing United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 68

S.Ct. 222, 225, 92 L.Ed.2d 210 (1948)).

See also Ybarra v.

Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238, reh. den. 444
U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct. 741, 62 L.Ed.2d 737 (1979) ("a person's mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity
does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that
person").
Finally, assuming arguendo that the meager facts known to
the deputy when he made the decision to detain Ms. Johnson in some
way amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle
was stolen and that Ms. Johnson was somehow implicated, the officer
exceeded the scope of any permissible seizure when he detained
Ms. Johnson to run a warrants check on her.
In Schlosser, this Court held that opening a passenger's
door exceeds the scope of a traffic stop.

774 P.2d at 1135.

Relying on Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149,
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1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), this Court noted that the United States
Supreme Court has held "that even a small intrusion beyond the
legitimate scope of an initially lawful search is unlawful under the
Fourth Amendment."

Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135.

In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 684 (1985), the
Court noted that "an investigative detention must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop."

Citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983),

the Court noted that "in assessing the effect of the length of the
detention, we take into account whether the police diligently
pursued their investigation."

Jd. at 709-10.

In the present case, the officer's actions in running a
warrant check on Ms. Johnson did not further any investigation into
whether the vehicle was in fact stolen.

The officer acknowledged

that ascertaining whether Ms. Johnson had a valid driver's license
would not help him determine whether the car was stolen (T. 15).
Furthermore, all of his actions and his testimony (T. 20, 21)
indicated that he did not believe the car was stolen but that he was
on a "fishing expedition" to see whether he could find some basis
for arresting either occupant of the vehicle.
A check on the vehicle or a simple question to the driver
as to who owned the vehicle and how she came to be in possession of
it would have resolved any "suspicion" or speculation that the
vehicle was stolen.

Assuming arguendo that the officer had a

reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, he
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violated Ms. Johnson's fourth amendment rights by failing to
diligently pursue the investigation and exceeding the scope of the
detention.
Under the circumstances of this case, the officer
detained Ms. Johnson based on a hunch, speculation or "possibility"
and not a constitutionally required reasonable articulable suspicion.
The decision of the Court of Appeals leaves officers with
unbridled discretion to detain and run a warrants check on all
passengers in vehicles where the owner is not present.

Persons who

look a little different or who officers want to "shake down" will be
detained while wealthier, more mainstream people riding in borrowed
cars will not be seized for warrants checks.
Even though common sense and the police officer in the
instant case agree that it is not unusual to stop cars and find that
the owner is not present (T. 17, 18) and even though the absence of
the registered owner is as consistent with innocent behavior as it
is with criminal behavior (Johnson, 771 P.2d at 329, Orem, J.,
dissenting), officers will be free to detain all occupants of a
vehicle who are riding in borrowed cars.

Such a result does not

comport with the freedoms guaranteed by our society or with the
reasonable expectation of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment,
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that she was detained
in violation of the fourth amendment.

Appellant further requests

that her conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a new
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trial with an order that the fruits of that illegal seizure be
suppressed (see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).

POINT II. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED
UTAH STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A. APPELLANT PRESERVED THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
The Court of Appeals refused to address the state
constitutional issue raised by Appellant because "defendant failed
to brief or argue these issues at the trial level . . . ."
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327-8.

State v.

Contrary to the decision of the Court

of Appeals, Appellant adequately raised this issue in the trial
court.
Appellant filed a written Motion to Suppress in which she
claimed that the detention in the present case violated her rights
against illegal search and seizure as articulated in both the
federal and state constitutions (R. 14 ) . 6
In her memorandum in support of that Motion to Suppress,
Appellant referred to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution
(R. 23). At oral argument on the Motion to Suppress, Appellant
again claimed that her rights under the Utah Constitution were
violated.

Defense counsel stated:
. . . . I think it violates the Utah Constitution
as well, although that has not been developed in
the case law very well, . . . .

6

The Motion to Suppress inadvertently cited Article I,
§ 13 rather than Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.
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(T. 40).
In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), a majority
of this Court, comprised of Chief Justice Hall, Justice Howe and
Judge Orme of the Court of Appeals, pointed out that this Court has
never drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded by the
Utah Constitution and the federal constitution in the search and
seizure context.

However, in footnote 8, this Court pointed out

that:
In declining to depart in this case from our
consistent refusal heretofore to interpret
Article I, Section 14 of our constitution in a
manner different from the fourth amendment to the
federal constitution, we have by no means ruled
out the possibility of doing so in some future
case.
Id. at 1221.
In his dissent in Watts, Justice Zimmerman pointed out
that he did not agree with the majority's assertions that the Court
had never drawn any distinctions between the two constitutions.
at 1225.

Id.

Justice Durham concurred with Justice Zimmerman's dissent.
Given the uncertainty reflected in Watts as to whether

any distinctions between the search and seizure provisions in the
two constitutions have been drawn in the past or will be drawn in
the future, defense counsel's statement that the Utah Constitutional
provision "has not been developed in the case law very well" (T. 40)
raised the issue for the trial court and reflected the current state
of the law.
The decision in Watts also reflects what has become a
difficult position for criminal defense lawyers.
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Criminal defense

lawyers are, for the most part, aware that this Court is interested
in a separate analysis of issues under the Utah Constitution.
However, because very little separate Utah Constitutional case law
has been developed and because other states rarely offer a case on
point, defense lawyers often have little substance to argue other
than that if the federal constitution does not protect the
defendant, the state constitution does.

Given the paucity of state

constitutional case law, such an argument at the trial level should
preserve a Utah Constitutional issue for appellate review.
In addition to the reference to the Utah Constitution in
the Motion to Suppress, Memorandum in Support of the Motion, and
oral argument, defense counsel submitted a number of cases to the
trial court (R. 29-92).

At least one of those, State v. Carpena,

714 P.2d at 675, explicitly refers to Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953
as amended) and thereby raised the statutory argument.

Other cases

submitted by defense counsel do not refer to either the State or
federal constitution and emphasize the overlap between the two
arguments and the confusion as to what distinction, if any, exists.
In reaching its decision that Appellant did not preserve
this issue for appellate review, the Court of Appeals relied on a
civil case, James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) for
the proposition that
Nominally alluding to such different
constitutional guarantees without any analysis
before the court does not sufficiently raise the
issue to permit consideration by this court on
appeal.
Johnson. 771 P.2d at 328.
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In James, the Court did not address whether nominally
raising a state constitutional issue preserves it for appeal.
Instead, the Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether
appellant James was precluded from raising an equitable mortgage
theory on appeal which had not been raised in the trial court.

The

rationale in James and the civil cases cited therein is that
theories which have not been argued or pled in the trial court
cannot be appropriately raised from either a legal or factual
standpoint on appeal.

The Court noted in James, however, that

A matter is sufficiently raised if it has been
submitted to the trial court and the trial court
has had an opportunity to make findings of fact or
law [citation omitted].
746 P.2d at 801.7

Hence, James does not support the stringent rule

for appellate review of state constitutional issues in criminal
cases outlined by the Court of Appeals in the present case.
The Court of Appeals also relied on State v. Carter, 707
P.2d 656 (Utah 1985), and State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981), in
reaching its decision that Appellant did not preserve this issue.
Neither case precludes appellate review under the circumstances of
this case.
In Lee, the defendant had argued at the trial court that

7

The Court further noted that the rule against raising
a legal theory for the first time on appeal is "to be stringently
applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial
[citation omitted]." 746 P.2d at 801. In the present case, all
factual issues had been presented to the trial court, so stringent
application of the rule against raising a new legal theory on appeal
is not necessary.
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the search was unlawful, thereby making the seizure unlawful, but
had not argued that the seizure alone was unconstitutional.

On

appeal, the defendant raised the seizure issue for the first time,
and this Court refused to address it.

Lee, 633 P.2d at 52-3. In

Carter, the defendant argued at the trial court that the frisk of
his person following his arrest was unlawful.

On appeal, he argued

for the first time that the search of his backpack was unlawful
because it was out of his possession at the time of the search.
This Court again refused to address the issue because it was out of
his possession at the time of the search.

This Court again refused

to address the issue because it had not been raised in the trial
court.

Carter, 707 P.2d at 660-1.
Unlike Carter or Lee, Appellant did not bring up the Utah

Constitutional issue for the first time on appeal.

Appellants

argument throughout has been that the detention of her person, where
she was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a faulty equipment
violation, was unlawful and that the fruits from that unlawful
detention should be suppressed.

She in fact raised the Utah

Constitutional issue in the trial court and recognized that a
separate Utah Constitutional analysis has not yet been developed in
case law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals fails to give
criminal defendants a clear picture of the extent of argument which
is necessary at the trial court level in order to preserve a state
constitutional issue for appeal.

Where provisions of the state

constitution have not been analyzed in case law requiring trial
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counsel to do more than name the applicable provision of the Utah
Constitution leaves appellate and trial counsel in a "never-never
land" where it is unclear in almost any case where little analysis
exists as to what exactly must be done to preserve an issue.

The

next step from Johnson is to refuse to review an issue on appeal
because in making his argument on appeal, defendant emphasizes a
case which he did not rely on at the trial court level.

Such a

position would turn the requirement that an issue be preserved at
trial into an elaborate game for which no one knows the precise
rules.
In this case, where Appellant referred to the Utah
Constitution in her Motion to Suppress and memorandum in support
thereof, orally argued that the area was not well developed,
presented case law, and placed the applicable evidence before the
court, the issue was adequatey raised in the trial court and
preserved for appellate review.

B. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED UTAH
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTONAL LAW.
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
As previously outlined, supra at 16-17, as a result of
this Court's decision in State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988),
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it is unclear what distinctions, if any, this Court has drawn
between Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution*

However, it is clear from

the decision in Watts that the possibility of interpreting
Article I, § 14 differently from the fourth amendment has not been
"ruled out."

Id. at 1221, fn. 8.

Historically, Utah adopted its constitution at a time
when the residents of this state may well have had a greater
interest in privacy than residents of other states.

Polygamy had

recently been outlawed as a prerequisite for statehood, and the
recent history of animosity between federal agents and state
residents regarding this issue supports a greater expectation of
privacy and an interpretation of the Utah Constitution giving
individuals greater protection under Article I, § 14 than under the
fourth amendment.
Case law from other states interpeting their state
constitutions can also be used to support Appellants argument that
the detention violated her rights under Article I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985), the
Alaska Supreme Court found that it should "construe Alaska7s
constitutional provisions such as Article I, Section 14 as affording
additional rights to those granted by the United States Supreme
Court under the federal constitution."

The Court in Jones chose to

apply a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under Alaska
law than is required under the federal constitution.
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The Washington

Supreme Court made a similar choice in State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d
13 6 (Wash. 1984).

In Jackson, the Court found that the Washington

Constitution provided greater protections than did the federal
constitution to the citizens of that state against unreasonable
searches and seizures by police.

Id. at 143.

In State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1369 (La. 1978), an
officer stopped a vehicle to issue a citation and ordered the
passengers out of the car.

As one of the passengers was getting

out, the officer noticed a sawed off shotgun in the car.
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that:
[b]y stopping the automobile the police have
decided that the driver will be detained. Such is
not the case for the passenger, who has not broken
the law and who may walk away from the scene
unless the police officer has some other
legitimate reason to detain him. Certainly the
passenger has a higher expectation of privacy than
the driver, because the passenger plays no part in
the routine traffic infraction and has reason to
suppose that any exchange with the authorities
will be conducted by the driver alone.
The Williams Court, without deciding the fourteenth
amendment issue, held that under the Louisiana Constitution, the
detention of the passengers was not permissible.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended) also supports
Appellant's argument that the detention violated the Utah
Constitution.

That statute provides:

77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
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The language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 indicates an
intent on the part of Utah's Legislature to provide the citizens of
this state with greater protection than is provided by the federal
constitution as interpreted in United States v. Merritt, 73 6 F.2d
223 (5th Cir. 1973).
Pursuant to this statute, a peace officer may stop a
person and ask for identification only when the officer has a
"reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity has occurred or is
about to occur.

Hence, while the United States Constitution may

allow for police citizen encounters absent a reasonable suspicion,
the Utah Legislature has provided otherwise, requiring a police
officer to have a reasonable suspicion to stop and question a
person.

Therefore, Utah statutory and constitutional law requires a

reasonable suspicion to stop and question an individual, even where
the detention does not amount to a "seizure" under the fourth
amendment.
As outlined in Point I, the officer "seized" Ms. Johnson
when he detained her to run a warrants check (see discussion supra
at 7-9). The language of the statute shows that in Utah, any
detention for the purpose of asking an individual's name amounts to
a seizure.

However, even if this Court does not agree that any

detention where the officer asks a person for identification amounts
to a seizure pursuant to Utah statutory and constitutional law, the
detention of Ms. Johnson in this case was a seizure of her person.
The officer detained Ms. Johnson for anywhere from several to
fifteen minutes (T. 19, 28). The officer did more than merely
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obtain information regarding Ms. Johnson's identity.

He expected

her to remain in the car while he ran a warrants check; she was not
free to leave and therefore was detained.
The officer in this case had no objective facts upon
which to base a reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of
Ms. Johnson.

The officer did not know whether the car was stolen,

nor did he run a check to find out even though he had the
opportunity to do so (T. 12). Even if the car had been stolen
(which it was not), there was nothing to connect Ms. Johnson to a
crime which may have been committed by the driver (see discussion
supra at 12).

The officer had a hunch which later proved to be

incorrect; a hunch does not amount to a reasonable suspicion.
The detention by the officer to check for outstanding
warrants also constitutes a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1953 as amended).

Pursuant to the statute, an officer must have

reasonable suspicion before questioning a person about her name and
address.

Under the facts of the instant case, no such suspicion

could have attached to Ms. Johnson.
As officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the
detention of Ms. Johnson, the evidence that flowed from the unlawful
seizure should have been suppressed.

See Wong Sun v. United States,

371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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CONCLUSION
Appellant requests that this Court reverse her conviction
and remand the case for a new trial with an order that the illegally
seized evidence be suppressed.
Respectfully submitted this £tf*HL day of
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
— —OOOOO-—-

Regular May Term, 1989

The State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Karen Marie Johnson,
Defendant and Petitioner.

June 12, 1989

NOc 890175

Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered
that a petition for Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as
prayed*
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and .Respondent,
v.
Karen Marie JOHNSON, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870222-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah,,
March lil 19HM
llpfieann^ Heniecj April.), urn;*
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District, Salt Lake County, Raymond 8,
Uno, J., of possession of controlled substance, and she appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) motor
vehicle passenger was seized within meaning of Fourth Amendment when deputy
sheriff who had stopped vehicle took passenger's name and birthdate and expected
her to wait while he ran warrants check,
but (2) seizure of passenger, who became
defendant, constituted temporary detention
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that passenger had committed crime,
Affirmed,
Orme, J., filed dissenting" opinion
i O i m m a i t a w <3=>1030(2)

Court of Appeals would not consider
claim raised for first time on appeal, that
Utah Constitution and law provide greater
protection than Fourth Amendment of
United States Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure. U.S.C A,
ConstAmend, 4; Const Art 1, § 14; U C
A.1953, 77-7-15.
2. Arrest <s>68(4)
Motor vehicle passenger was seized
within meaning of Fourth Amendment
when deputy sheriff who had stopped vehicle took passenger's name and birthdate
and expected her to wait while he ran warrants check; under totality of the circumstancesf passenger was reasonably justified
lc At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing

m belief that she was MOT *
A ConstAmend 4
,i Automobiles &*'£•&{ i; * s
Fourth Amendment seizure of motor
vehicle passenger constituted temporary
detention supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that passenger had committed
crime; trial judge believed deputy sheriffs
testimony that deputy believed there was
possibility vehicle he had stopped for having faulty brake light was stolen as driver
was not registered owner and was unable
to find vehicle registration, it was reasonable to ask passenger her name to determine if her names corresponded with owner's name that had been learned prior to
stopping of vehicle, and passenger was not
detained for unreasonable period of time.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt (argued),
Salt Lake Legal Defenders, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant,
R Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R.
Larsen (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., for
plaintiff and respondent
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and

OPLN
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of her motion
to suppress and her conviction for possession of a controlled substance.1 We affirm.
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a
faulty brake light Defendant was a passenger in that vehicle. At the suppression
hearing, Stroud testified that prior to
stopping the vehicle, he ran a check on the
license plate and obtained the name of the
registered owner. He then approached the
stopped vehicle and asked the driver for
her license. The name on the license was
not the name of the registered owner.
on, defendant's motion to suppress.
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When Stroud requested the registration
certificate, the driver was unable to produce it Stroud then asked defendant for
identification, reasoning that there was a
possibility the car was stolen because there
was no registration and no owner present
After initially denying that she had any
identification, defendant told Stroud her
name and birthdate.
Stating that he would be right back and
expecting the driver and defendant to remain, Stroud returned to his vehicle and
ran license checks on the two, determining
that the driver was driving on a suspended
license and that defendant had several outstanding warrants. He did not, however,
inquire as to whether the car was stolen,
nor did he know of any reports of stolen
cars matching that car's description. He
then wrote a citation on the driver and
requested a backup police officer.
When defendant was informed that she
was being arrested for outstanding warrants, she exited the vehicle, holding a
backpack which had the name "Karen" on
it Defendant initially denied that the
backpack belonged to her, but later admitted that it was hers. Incident to her arrest, the bag was searched and was found
to contain amphetamines, drug paraphernalia and defendant's Utah identification.
Defendant's version of the sequence of
events varies from Stroud's. She testified
that after Stroud received the driver's license, he asked defendant if she had any
identification. She said that she did not
He told them to wait, that he would be
right back, and returned to his vehicle for
five or ten minutes, long enough for her to
smoke a cigarette or two. When he returned, he asked for the registration certificate. When it could not be produced,
Stroud asked defendant to return to his
vehicle with him, where, at his request, she
gave him her name and birthdate. He then
sent her back to the other car. Fifteen
minutes later, he came back to their car,
gave the driver a citation, took defendant
out of the car, frisked and handcuffed her,

[1] Defendant claims that her detention
violated the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section
14 of the Utah Constitution. She also argues that the legislative intent behind Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1980) was to provide
greater protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures than is provided by
the fourth amendment, and that her seizure violated the provisions of both constitutions.2 However, defendant failed to

2. Utah has never drawn any distinctions between these two provisions and has "always
considered the protections afforded to be one
and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219,

1221 (Utah 1988). However, in a footnote comment, the court indicated that it has not ruled
out the possibility of making such a distinction
in a future case. Id. at n. 8.

and put her in the front seat of the sheriffs car. She had possession of her bag at
this time. Defendant stated that she gave
Stroud her name and birthdate because she
was required to do so, and did not believe
that she could leave.
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether
defendant may raise, for the first time on
appeal, the argument that state law and
article 1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution
provide greater protection than the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure; (2) whether defendant, a passenger
in a motor vehicle, was seized within the
meaning of the fourth amendment; and (3)
if there was a seizure, whether it was
reasonable.
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress,
we will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987). The trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility and accuracy
of the witnesses' divergent testimonies.
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-156,
(Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 974 (Utah CtApp.1988). However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a "correction of error" standard. Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988).
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
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brief or argue these issues at the trial level
and first raised her statutory argument in
her appellate brief. Nominally alluding to
such different constitutional guarantees
without any analysis before the trial court
does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit consideration by this court on appeal
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah
CtApp.1987). "[W]here a defendant fails
to assert a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal.... [M]otions to
suppress should be supported by precise
averments, not conclusory allegations...."
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah
1985). Also, in State v, Leet 633 P.2d 48,
53 (Utah 1981), the supreme court stated:
There is nothing in the record to indicate
that the point now urged upon this Court
was unavailable or unknown to defendant at the time he filed his motion to
suppress, and to entertain the point now
would be to sanction the practice of withholding positions that should properly be
presented to the trial court, but which
may be withheld for the purpose of seeking a reversal on appeal and a new trial
or dismissal
We, therefore, decline to consider" this argument on appeal
SEIZURE
[2] Defendant avers 'that she was
seized within the meaning of the fourth
amendment because she felt that she was
not free to leave when Stroud told her to
wait while he returned to his vehicle to
check on the driver's license and to run a
warrants check on defendant. "A seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment occurs only when the officer by
means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of
a person/' State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85,
87 (Utah CtApp.1987). Further, "[w]hen a
reasonable person, based on the totality of
the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation ,« but because he believes he is not free to leave/* a seizure
occurs* Id.; see also United States v.
Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct
1870, 1877, 64 LEd.2d 497 (1980). Defen-

dant was, therefore, seized when Stroud
took her name and birthdate and expected
her to wait while he ran a warrants check.
Under the totality of the circumstances
defendant was reasonably justified in her
belief that she was not free to go.
[3] Now; the concern is whether the
seizure was reasonable and permissible Hinder the fourth amendment In State v.
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court adopted
the reasoning in United States v. Merritt,
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), wherein
the Fifth Circuit specified three constitutionally permissible levels of police stops;
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if
the officer has an "articulable suspicion"
that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime; however, 'the
"detention must be temporary and last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer'
may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed or is being committed.
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18.
We conclude that the present case involves a "level two" stop. Thus, to justify
the seizure, Stroud had to have a reasonable "articulable suspicion" that defendant
had committed a crime. To determine if he
acted reasonably under the circumstances,
"due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch/ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1883,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
At this point, we defer to the findings of
the trial judge because of his preferred
position in evaluating the witnesses' credibility. See Arroyo, at 154-156. The
record indicates that the trial court believed Stroud's testimony in concluding
there was an articulable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime. Prior to
asking defendant for identification, Stroud
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believed that there was a possibility the car
was stolen because the owner was absent
and there was no registration. He knew
that the driver was not the owner, but
determined that it was reasonable to ask
defendant her name to determine if it corresponded with the owner's name he had
learned prior to stopping the vehicle. The
fact that Stroud initially chose to do a
warrants check instead of a stolen vehicle
check is of no great significance because
not all stolen cars are reported immediately. The trial judge stated that where there
is a legitimate traffic stop, the driver has a
suspended license, and there is "no way of
telling who the owner of the vehicle is and
whether they have permission to drive it
because the owner is not present," a reasonable officer would inquire regarding the
identity of a passenger. In weighing the
testimony, the court was justified in finding that the amount of time defendant was
required to wait, even though a passenger,
was reasonable and did not take any longer
than a normal traffic stop.
Thus, there was substantial evidence for
the trial court to find as it did. Although a
seizure occurred, it conformed to constitutional requirements in that Officer Stroud
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that
the car could have been stolen, and defendant was not detained for an unreasonable

period of time We, therefore, affirm defendant's conviction.
DAVIDSON, J., concurs.
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
Although the legal analysis applicable to
this case is ably set out in the majority's
opinion, I cannot agree with their ultimate
conclusion that the arresting officer had an
articulable suspicion that the automobile
had been stolen, much less that defendant
had in any way participated in the theft
The only facts relied on by the officer
were that the driver's name was not the
name of the registered owner and the driver was not able to locate the registration
certificate. These facts are just as consistent with the more likely scenario that the
driver borrowed the car from its rightful
owner. Absent more—and this is all the
officer pointed to—there was simply no
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law,
that the car had been stolen.
I would accordingly reverse.
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